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With the frequent imposition of anti-dumping (AD) 
actions carried out by Indonesia over the past two 
decades, it is necessary to examine what impact 
these measures have had on the country’s imports. 
Empirically, this study examines the effect of AD 
measures on Indonesian imports using UN 
Comtrade data at the 6-digit HS codes product 
level. The evidence presented in this paper shows 
that AD does have a significant restriction effect on 
imports from named countries. AD measures 
succeeded in reducing the import value of the 
products concerned by about 126% during the 
period of imposition. In addition, there is no 
evidence of trade diversion effects to non-named 
countries. During the first three years of AD 
measures, the value of imports to non-named 
countries decreased by around 53%. It is therefore 
concluded that Indonesia's AD policy has helped to 
check unwanted imports and therefore may qualify 
as effective. The empirical model of the study is 
estimated using the system GMM estimator. 
 
Keywords: Anti-dumping, trade restriction 





Diberlakukannya tindakan anti-dumping (AD) 
yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia terhadap negara-
negara yang melakukan dumping selama dua 
dekade terakhir, penting untuk memeriksa dampak 
apa yang telah dihasilkan oleh kebijakan ini 
terhadap impor dari negara-negara tersebut. Secara 
empiris, penelitian ini menguji pengaruh langkah-
langkah AD terhadap impor Indonesia 
menggunakan data UN Comtrade pada tingkat 
produk kode HS 6 digit. Bukti yang disajikan 
dalam makalah ini menunjukkan bahwa AD 
memang memiliki pengaruh pembatasan yang 
signifikan terhadap impor dari negara-negara yang 
dikenakan bea masuk AD. Langkah-langkah AD 
berhasil mengurangi nilai impor produk yang 
bersangkutan sekitar 126% selama periode 
pengenaan. Selain itu, tidak ada bukti efek 
pengalihan perdagangan ke negara-negara yang 
tidak dikenakan bea masuk AD. Selama tiga tahun 
pertama kebijakan AD, nilai impor ke negara-
negara yang tidak dikenakan bea masuk AD 
menurun sekitar 53%. Oleh karena itu disimpulkan 
bahwa kebijakan AD Indonesia telah membantu 
menekan impor yang tidak diinginkan dan 
karenanya memenuhi syarat sebagai efektif. Model 
empiris studi ini diestimasi menggunakan penduga 
sistem GMM. 
 
Kata Kunci: Anti-dumping, efek pembatasan 
perdagangan, efek pengalihan perdagangan, 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Competition is a natural part of 
international trade and can stimulate 
innovation. Traders will continue to innovate 
in order to gain market share and accumulate 
large profits. However, in achieving these 
goals, companies or countries sometimes 
carry out unfair trade practices such as 
dumping. In this regard, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) allows its members to 
impose trade protection measures to protect 
domestic producers from imported goods 
under certain conditions. These security 
measures include anti-dumping (AD) policies, 
which are aimed to dealing with unfair imports 
from certain countries that enter the domestic 
market. 
Although some countries have 
implemented AD measures to overcome 
unfair trade practices, their implementation is 
often not effective (Prusa, 2005). Though AD 
measures do indeed reduce the number of 
imported dumping products because import 
prices are made more expensive (trade 
restriction effects), the import of these 
products may not decrease significantly 
because there are other countries that also 
produce similar (non-dumped) goods at lower 
prices than the prices of domestic products. In 
that case, the source of importation is diverted 
from the country that is subject to AD action 
to a country that is not subject to AD measures 
(trade diversion effects). 
During the period 1996-2018, 
Indonesia conducted 136 initiations of 
dumping allegations and 28 allegations of 
safeguards (WTO, 2018). After investigation, 
there were 63 cases that were eventually 
subject to AD import duties, which are known 
as locally as Bea Masuk Antidumping 
(BMAD). However, Indonesia has never 
initiated any accusations or imposed anti-
subsidy actions in other countries. 
With the above background in mind, 
this study analyzes the effectiveness of 
Indonesia's AD against its import 
performance. The impact of anti-dumping 
policy literature in developing country still 
relatively limited (Ganguli, 2008). In 
Indonesia, Alhayat (2014) examined the effect 
of AD measures on 18 products subject to AD 
duties. Using OLS method, he found that 
during the period of investigation, the 
Indonesian AD measures negatively affected 
the overall performance of imported products, 
but that they were unable to stem an increase 
in imports. Similar to what Alhayat has 
studied, this study uses six-digit Harmonized 
System Codes (HS6) data product. However, 
we use the change in import data for each 
country instead of using only 18 aggregate 
import products. This study also includes 
other methods besides OLS, such as 
Generalized Moment of Method (GMM) 
because of the characteristics of data that 
include the previous year's import variable 
(lag variable). The parameter estimation of the 
dynamic panel data model can be conducted 
through the OLS method, but the estimated 
value obtained by this method will be biased 
and inconsistent due to the lag of the 
dependent variable being correlated with 
errors (Anderson & Hsiao, 1982). 
By combining unique AD data from 
the Global Antidumping Database with import 
data from UN Comtrade at the product level 
(HS6), we conducted an empirical study of the 
effectiveness of AD measures in Indonesia 
from 1996 to 2015. In general, this study will 
focus on examining two viewpoints on the 
effects of AD policies, consisting of the 
effects of trade restrictions and the effects of 
trade diversion. The rest of this paper will be 
structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
study’s conceptual framework and presents a 
literature review related to dumping and AD 
in international trade. Section 3 presents the 
data and methodology used in this study. 
Section 4 discusses the study’s estimation 
result and findings. Finally, Section 5 provides 
the conclusion of the research study. 
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2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 International Trade  
Within the framework of international 
trade there are several views on fundamental 
trading theory. Initially, Adam Smith first 
came out with his flagship ideas about the 
trade nerve center, namely 'absolute 
advantage' which emphasizes how a country 
produces goods smoothly and efficiently 
compared to other countries. For example, if 
Indonesia can produce rice and corn more 
efficiently than Singapore both in terms of 
natural resources and labor, it means that 
Indonesia is at an 'absolute advantage' over 
Singapore in producing rice and corn. As a 
result, Indonesia will become a country that 
specializes in producing rice and corn. Several 
years later, Ricardo (1817) emerged with his 
critique of the theory of 'absolute advantage' 
by introducing a new concept of international 
trade theory which paid attention to the 
'opportunity cost'. This means that a country 
will decide to import rice, for example if the 
cost of establishing a company to produce rice 
is higher than importing it from other 
countries.  
2.2 Dumping and Antidumping in WTO 
Framework  
Blonigen & Prusa (2016) provide two 
definitions of dumping. Firstly, it is defined as 
the practice of selling goods on the export 
market at a price level that is lower than the 
exporter’s own domestic price level. 
Secondly, it is defined as the practice of 
selling goods at a price level on the export 
market that is lower than the exporter’s 
average cost of production. Furthermore, 
depending on the reasons for its use, dumping 
is categorized into two forms. First, the 
decline of demand in the domestic market due 
to business cycles may induce companies to 
sell their excess production to the export 
market at lower prices, in order to encourage 
sales. This form is called ‘sporadic dumping’ 
because it is associated with economic 
fluctuations. Second, when a company sells its 
products at a lower price on the export market 
with the aim of suppressing domestic 
companies or preventing the entry of new 
competitors, the practice is called ‘predatory 
dumping’. 
WTO provisions regarding dumping 
and AD are basically non-judgmental, but 
rather provide guidance on how WTO 
member countries can respond (can or cannot 
react) to dumping actions. In particular, the 
provisions regarding AD actions are regulated 
in Article VI General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT, 1994) also known as the 
"Anti-dumping Agreement". The AD 
agreement allows the government to act 
against dumping if, after an investigation has 
proven that dumping is actually occurring, 
there is a “material” injury to competing 
domestic industries (producing similar 
products), and there is a relationship in which 
dumping causes injury or threatens domestic 
industries. 
Based on the AD agreement, there are 
three methods used to determine the level of 
dumping and to calculate the “normal price” 
of a product. Firstly, the normal price must be 
calculated based on the selling price of the 
product in the exporter's domestic market. 
Secondly, if this information is not available, 
the calculation of normal prices can use prices 
charged by exporters in other countries. 
Thirdly, the normal price can be calculated 
based on "constructed normal value", which is 
a combination of production costs, sales costs, 
administrative costs, and normal gain 
margins. The agreement also determines how 
to make a fair assessment between export 
prices and the normal price, for example in 
determining exchange rates. 
However, calculation of the level of 
dumping of a product alone is not enough. AD 
actions can only be implemented if dumping 
causes material losses to the industry in the 
importing country that are not due to other 
factors. Therefore, in the process of 
investigation of domestic industry losses, the 
importing country must estimate all relevant 
economic aspects related to the circumstances 
of the industry concerned, including the 
volume and import prices not sold at dumping 
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prices, contractions in demand or changes in 
consumption behavior, technological 
developments, and export performance. 
AD measures generally involve the 
imposition of additional import duties on 
certain products from the exporting country, to 
bring the export price closer to normal values 
or to eliminate domestic industry losses in the 
importing country. In addition, exporters can 
voluntarily raise the selling price of a product 
to an agreed level to avoid AD duties if the 
investigation shows that dumping has taken 
place and the domestic industry is 
experiencing material injury. 
Detailed procedures for AD provisions 
regulate how AD cases must begin, how the 
investigation must be carried out, and the 
conditions to ensure that all involved parties 
are given the opportunity to submit evidence. 
Five years after the date of imposition, AD 
measures must end unless an investigation 
shows that ending AD measures would lead to 
injury. 
The AD agreement also stipulates that WTO 
member countries must inform the AD 
Practice Committee about all AD actions from 
the beginning to the end of the process, 
immediately, and in detail. WTO member 
countries must also report all inquiries twice a 
year. When differences of opinion arise 
regarding the imposition of AD actions, 
members are encouraged to discuss them with 
each other first. If they are still not satisfied 
with the results of the consultation, they can 
solve the problem by implementing a dispute 
resolution procedure provided by the WTO. 
AD investigations can be stopped 
immediately when it is known that the 
dumping margin is insignificant (less than 2% 
of the exporter product price). In addition, 
investigations must also stop if the dumping 
import volume from one country is considered 
trivial (less than 3% of total imports of the 
product); though investigations can continue 
if a group of countries, each supplying less 
than 3% of the imports, together account for 
7% or more of total imports (WTO, 2020). 
In line with WTO regulations, AD 
provisions in Indonesia are regulated through 
Government Regulation (PP) No. 34 of 1996 
concerning AD Import Duty and Rewards 
Duty and have been renewed with PP No. 34 
of 2011 concerning Antidumping Measures, 
Actions Trade Safeguard Rewards and 
Measures. Based on the PP, the government 
established the Indonesian AD Committee 
(KADI) as the investigation authority for 
dumping and subsidies. Procedures for 
investigations in the context of imposing AD 
measures are regulated by Minister of Trade 
Regulation number No.76/M-
DAG/PER/12/2012 as amended by Minister 
of Trade Regulation number No.53/M-
DAG/PER/ 9/2013. 
2.3 Previous Studies 
There have been many previous 
studies that have analyzed the impact of AD 
measures on trade flows by examining the AD 
cases of various countries. Prusa (1996) and 
Malhotra, Kassam, & Rus (2008) use United 
States (US) AD data; Konings, 
Vandenbussche, & Springael (2001) use 
European Union (EU) AD data; Ganguli 
(2008) uses Indian AD data; Park (2009), Lee, 
Park, & Cui (2013) use AD data of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC); and 
Alhayat (2014) and Tjahjasari (2015) use 
Indonesian AD data. These studies explicitly 
identified the impact of AD into the effects of 
trade restriction and the effect of trade 
diversion, particularly related to imports of 
products that became subjects of AD 
measures.  
Prusa (1996) examined how effective 
the impact of AD protection was by using US 
AD data from the period 1978-1993. The 
results of this analysis show that AD has led 
to significant trade diversion from countries 
accused of dumping into countries not accused 
of dumping. In addition, the study also found 
that the greater the AD rates imposed, the 
greater the trade diversion. Due to the large 
transfer of import origin, the results of Prusa’s 
study indicate that AD rates have a trade 
restriction effect that is lower than what is 
expected by domestic industries. Nonetheless, 
AD rates are still beneficial because they have 
a larger restriction effect for cases that are 
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ultimately subject to AD than for cases that are 
rejected. AD actions are still significant for the 
protection of domestic industries because they 
are able to increase import prices 
significantly; both for the country of origin of 
imports that are affected by AD, and for the 
country of origin of imports that are not 
mentioned in the AD determination. 
Konings, Vandenbussche, and 
Springael (2001) conducted an empirical 
study of the impact of the European Union's 
(EU) AD action on the transfer of imports 
from countries named in an AD investigation. 
The extent of the transfer of imports is an 
indicator of the effectiveness of AD policies to 
protect domestic industries from imported 
products. The data used are all cases of AD 
inquiries in the EU between 1990 and 1995 
using the classification of 6-digit Nimexe 
trade data and 8-digit Harmonized System 
(HS). The study’s empirical results showed 
that trade diversion in the EU as a result of AD 
actions was relatively small, which differed 
from the results commonly found in the US. In 
addition, it was concluded that EU AD 
policies were more effectively applied to 
competitive sectors characterized by low 
levels of industrial concentration. 
Ganguli (2008) established an 
empirical study of the impact of AD in the 
case of India. The data used in the study was 
the 1992-2002 period using a 6-digit HS data 
aggregation, and the study found that AD has 
a significant effect on the accused country. 
Though the transfer of trade to a country that 
was not subject to AD did indeed reduce 
profits for the Indian domestic industry, 
overall, the effect of the AD policy assisted in 
controlling unwanted imports. 
Lee, Park, and Cui (2013) empirically 
examined the impact of US AD actions on the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), both in 
bilateral trade between the two countries and 
US imports from other trading partners. The 
study found both effects of trade restrictions 
and trade diversion effects. The impact of 
trade restrictions only occurs in the short term, 
and the inquiry process helped to sharply 
decrease US imports from China. Moreover, 
the US AD action against China opened 
chances for the entry of imported goods from 
countries other than China. Moreover, AD 
measures effectively increased the import 
prices of dumped products. In addition, the 
greater the AD rate that was imposed, the 
higher the effect of trade restrictions and trade 
diversion that was caused. 
In Indonesia, Alhayat (2014) 
examined the effect of AD measures on 18 
products subject to AD duties. The study 
found that, during the period of investigation, 
the Indonesian AD measures negatively 
affected the overall performance of imported 
products, but that they were unable to stem an 
increase in imports. This shows that the AD 
measures taken by Indonesia have not been 
fully effective due to trade diversion from 
other countries. 
Furthermore, Tjahjasari (2015) 
conducted a study on the impact of the AD 
policy on Cold Rolled Coil/Sheet imports 
(CRC/S) in Indonesia. She compares the 
impact of the AD policy on countries subject 
to AD duties, and countries not subject to 
these duties. The results of the study show that 
the AD measure had a negative significant 
impact on the volume of CRC/S imports from 
the five AD-affected countries. On the other 
hand, there was a positive impact of AD duties 
on the import volumes of non-AD-affected 
countries. This result indicates that trade 
diversion took place from AD-affected to non-
AD-affected countries. 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this study are cases 
that have been subject to definitive AD actions 
during the period 1996- 2015. The AD cases 
taken were limited to 2015 because we wanted 
to know the impact of the imposition of AD 
measures in the first to third year, where 2018 
was the latest year with available annual 
import data. The main data on AD cases is 
sourced from the Global AD Database 
managed by Bown (2015) because it provides 
detailed information about the type of product, 
the HS code used, the exporting country 
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involved, the date of initiation and the date of 
imposition, and the amount of AD duties. To 
facilitate the collection of import data related 
to products subject to AD measures, the 
classification of 6-digit HS codes is sourced 
from UN Comtrade. 
The case of hot-rolled carbon (HRC) 
steel plate was the first dumping case handled 
by Indonesia since the enactment of 
Government Regulation No. 34 of 1996 
concerning Anti-Dumping, Import Duty and 
Rewards Duty. Investigation of imported 
HRC products originating from China, India, 
Russia, Taiwan, and Thailand began on 
December 19 1996 and ended with the 
imposition of AD measures stipulated through 
the Minister of Finance Regulation on 
September 29 1997, with BMAD rates ranging 
from 18% to 42%. The summary of 
Indonesia's AD measures from 1996-2015 can 
be seen further in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - Countries Most Frequently Named, 1996–2015, Source: Global 
Antidumping Database 2015, processed using Stata 
 
Figure 3.1 describes the countries that 
have been subject to AD measures by 
Indonesia. We can see that China is the most 
frequently named country subject to AD 
duties with 11 cases, followed by India and 
Korea with 8 and 5 cases, respectively. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The graph below provides the value of 
Indonesia's imports from partner countries 
that were subject to AD measures during 
1996-2015. As shown in Figure 3.2, it can be 
seen that the largest import value from named 
countries was South Korea with US$2,246 
million, followed by Malaysia, China, and 
Vietnam, respectively. The smallest import 
value was the USA with US$3.56 million, 
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                                (Source: UN Comtrade, processed) 
Figure 3.2 – Value of Import from Named Countries 
 
 
                                (Source: UN Comtrade, processed) 
Figure 3.3 – Total Value Import Filed by Year 
 
 
Furthermore, if we describe the total 
value of imports per year, we can see in Figure 
3.3 that the largest import value from named 
countries was carried out in 2012, at US$1,832 
million dollars. Likewise, the largest import 
value from non-named countries was in 2012, 
with a value of US$6,492 million. 
3.3 Methodology 
This study uses panel data with several 
estimating methods, such as Common Effect 
(OLS), Fixed Effects, Random Effects, and 
Systems GMM. The purpose of using these 
estimators is to get the best results by 
comparing the models. In the Common Effect 
estimator, the model assumes that the intercept 
and slope coefficients are constant over 
individual and time, and the error term 
explains that differences in the intercept and 
slope coefficients. Thus, in this model there 
are no individual effects.  
Furthermore, the model that assumes 
the existence of intercept differences for each 
individual is known as the Fixed Effects 
Model (FEM). The term ‘fixed effects’ comes 
from the fact that, although intercepts are 
different in each individual, each individual's 
intercept does not vary or is fixed all the time 
(time-invariant). In addition, the model also 
assumes that the slope coefficient is constant 
over individual and time. Estimation is done 
by using a dummy variable technique for 
individuals. 
Another model used is the Random 
Effects Model (REM), which assumes that the 
variation across countries is random and 
uncorrelated with the independent variable. In 
the FEM, each cross-sectional unit has its own 
fixed intercept value, while in the REM, 
intercept expresses the average value of all 
cross-sectional unit intercepts, and component 
error denotes the deviation of individual 
intercepts to the average value. Component 
errors are not directly observable and are also 
known as latent variables.  
The choice of panel data estimation 
method – whether common effect, fixed 
effects, or random effects – can be achieved 
using several tests. Firstly, the F-Test/ Chow 
Test is used to see whether there are individual 
effects on the variable. The null hypothesis 
(𝐻0) in the F-test denotes no individual effect. 
If the value of F-statistics > F-table value, then 
𝐻0 is rejected, which means the best statistical 
model is the FEM.  
Furthermore, the test to choose 
between random effect and fixed effect 
models is the Hausman Test developed by 
Hausman (1978). The main consideration in 
choosing a random effects or fixed effects 
model is whether unobserved effect (𝑐𝑖) and 
explanatory variables (𝑥𝑖𝑡) are correlated or 
not. The fixed effects model is consistent if 
(𝑐𝑖) and (𝑥𝑖𝑡) are correlated, whereas the 
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and (𝑥𝑖𝑡) are correlated (Wooldridge, 2002). 
The T-statistic from the Hausman test has an 
asymptotic chi-square (𝑋2) distribution. The 
null hypothesis in the Hausman test is the 
fixed effects and random effects estimators do 
not differ substantially. If Hausman statistics 
> chi square (𝑋2) table, then 𝐻0 is rejected. 
The conclusion is that the random effects 
model cannot be used, so it is better to use the 
fixed effects model. 
In addition to the three statistical panel 
models discussed above, this study also uses a 
dynamic panel data model that includes lag as 
an explanatory variable. The parameter 
estimation of the dynamic panel data model 
can be conducted through the OLS method, 
but the estimated value obtained by this 
method will be biased and inconsistent due to 
the lag of the dependent variable being 
correlated with errors. To overcome this 
problem, according to Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982), we can use the Instrumental Variable 
(IV) estimation method to replace variables 
that correlate with errors. However, this 
method only produces parameters that are 
consistent, but not efficient. 
Anderson and Hsiao’s method were 
then developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
who produced an unbiased, consistent, and 
efficient estimate known as the GMM  
estimator. Although GMM estimators 
are efficient, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
propose estimators that they claim are still 
more efficient. The reason for this is that the 
Arellano and Bond method uses only the 
moment conditions and instrument variable 
matrix contained in the first difference model. 
Blundell and Bond suggested the use of 
additional level information by combining the 
moment conditions and instrument variable 
matrix between the two (first difference and 
level), which will produce a system GMM 
estimator. 
3.4 Model Specification and Description of 
Variables 
The econometric model used in this 
study refers to the specifications of the 
Ganguli (2008) models. The impact of AD is 
specified as the impact on imports from 
countries subject to AD (the effect of trade 
restrictions), the impact on imports from 
countries that are not subject to AD (the effect 
of trade diversion), and the impact on total 
imports of products subject to AD (overall 






= 𝛼 +  𝛽0 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑗
+ 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−2
𝑗
+ 𝛽2 (𝑙𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦𝑖 × 𝑡0) + 𝛽3 (𝑙𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦𝑖 × 𝑡1) +




  : value of product imports in AD case 𝑖 at the time 𝑡𝑘  
  belonging to the country group 𝑗 (named, non-named) 
𝑡𝑘      : year related to AD actions on 𝑘 = -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3 
• 𝑡−2,  𝑡−1  : years before the AD action was initiated 
• 𝑡0              : years in which the AD action was investigated 
• 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3  : years in which the AD action was imposed 
(𝑙𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦𝑖 × 𝑡𝑝) : interacted duty terms, (p = 0, 1, 2, 3) 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑘   : calendar year dummies 
From the above model, we expect that 
AD measures will negatively affect the value 
of imported products at 𝑡0–𝑡3 from named 
countries (the effect of trade restrictions on 
named countries), and have a positive effect 
on the value of imported products from non-
named countries (the effect of trade diversion) 
for the same period.  
Two immediate lags as explanatory 
variables are included to control for the size 
effects of initial imports, while interacted duty 
terms capture the effect of the duty after the 
AD action was initiated. Lastly, the year 
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dummy variables are considered in the model 
as a control variable for macroeconomic 
trends. 
4 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
4.1 Named Countries 
Empirical tests were performed by 
comparing several estimators. Table 4.1 
presents OLS regression in column (1), panel 
regression in column (2), and system GMM in 
column (3). The Hausman test result (see 
Appendix 1) shows that a probability value of 
0.0095 is less than the 5% significance level, 
meaning that there is evidence to reject 𝐻0. 
Therefore, it is better to use the FEM than the 
REM. 
Based on the estimation results in 
column (1) and column (2), the OLS estimator 
and the fixed effects estimator show a 
consistency of results, where all variables are 
statistically significant to the value of the 
named countries’ imports. However, in the 
system GMM model, only  𝑡2 and 𝑡3 are 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 4.1 Regression Results from Named Countries 
Variables 
OLS Panel System GMM 
(1) (2) (3) 







Ln (Import Values in 
𝑡−1) 
  1.142*** 
(0.211) 
Ln (Import Values in 
𝑡−2) 
  -0.517*** 
(0.132) 

























Model  Fixed Effect  
F Statistics 11.27*** 9.02*** 20.03*** 
Notes: significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The best model selection can be seen 
from the F Statistics row: of the 3 models, 
model 3 provides the highest F Statistics 
value. Thus, the model chosen in this study is 
model 3, which uses the system GMM 
estimator in column (3). 
4.2 Non-Named Countries 
Table 4.2 presents OLS regression in 
column (1), panel regression in column (2), 
and system GMM in column (3). The 
Hausman test result (see Appendix 2) shows 
that a probability value of 0.8437 is greater 
than the 5% significance level, meaning that 
there is not enough evidence to reject 𝐻0. 
Therefore, we choose the random effects 
model for this panel regression. 
Based on the estimation results in 
column (1) to (3), all estimators show a 
consistency of results, where variables Cross 
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Effect 𝑡3 are statistically significant to the 
value of non-named countries’ imports. 
However, only the system GMM model 
provides a feasibility test model or F Statistics 
< significance alpha 5%. Thus, the model 
chosen in this study is model 3, which uses the 
system GMM estimator in column (3). 
 
 
Table 4.2 Regression Result from Non-Named Countries 
Variables 
OLS Panel System GMM 
(1) (2) (3) 







Ln (Import Values in 
𝑡−1) 
  0.928*** 
(0.205) 
Ln (Import Values in 
𝑡−2) 
  -0.433*** 
(0.090) 

























Model  Random Effect  
F Statistics 1.36 10.81*** 34.29*** 
Notes: significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
4.3 All Countries 
Table 4.3 presents OLS regression in 
column (1), panel regression in column (2), 
and system GMM in column (3). The 
Hausman test result (see Appendix 3) shows 
that a probability value of 0.0012 is less than 
the 5% significance level, meaning that there 
is evidence to reject 𝐻0, so it is better to use 
fixed effects model. Based on the estimation 
results in column (1) to (3), all estimators 
show a consistency of results where variables 
Cross Effect 𝑡3 are statistically significant to 
the value of all countries’ imports.  
There are two models that run a 
feasibility test model or F statistics < 
significance alpha 5%, fixed effects and 
system GMM. Of these two models, system 
GMM provides the highest F statistics value. 
Thus, the model chosen in this study is model 
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Table 4.3 Regression Result from All Countries 
Variables 
OLS Panel System GMM 
(1) (2) (3) 







Ln (Import Values in 
𝑡−1) 
  0.942*** 
(0.241) 
Ln (Import Values in 
𝑡−2) 
  -0.459*** 
(0.090) 

























Model  Fixed Effect  
F Statistics 2.03 2.27 42.54*** 
Notes: significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
4.4 System GMM Estimates 
4.4.1 Named Countries 
The estimation results of equation (3) 
using the system GMM method are presented 
in column (1) of Table 4.4 (below). The results 
are as expected: AD measures have a trade 
restriction effect on Indonesia's imports from 
the named countries during the investigation 
and imposition periods, which is indicated by 
the negative coefficient on 𝑡0-𝑡3 variables. 
For imports from named countries, an 
AD investigation of dumped products at 𝑡0 
decreases the value of imported products 
compared to the previous period. This 
indicates the existence of a harassment effect; 
that is, when the AD investigation itself has an 
effect on imports even though a final decision 
has not yet been made (Niels, 2003). 
In the period of protection (𝑡1-𝑡3), 
import values decreased by 32.6%, 42.8%, 
and 50.8%, respectively. In other words, AD 
measures succeeded in reducing the import 
value of the product concerned by about 126% 
during the period of imposition. However, 
only import values for years 𝑡2 and 𝑡3 are 
statistically significant under a 10 percent 
significance level (α = 10%), while variables 
𝑡0 and 𝑡1 are not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, a continued negative sign 
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Table 4.4 System GMM Estimates 
Variables 
Named Non-Named Overall 
(1) (2) (3) 
















































F Statistics 20.03*** 34.29*** 42.54*** 
Notes: significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
4.4.2 Non-Named Countries
Column (2) of Table 4.4 presents the 
system GMM estimates of equation (1) for the 
non-named countries. The results here are 
quite similar to the results from the named 
countries discussed above. The negative 
coefficient signs of interaction terms indicate 
that AD measures cause a decrease in import 
values for non-named countries. This means 
that there are no indications of import 
diversion to third countries, which is counter 
to initial expectations that predicted a positive 
effect for the non-named countries.  
In the period of protection (𝑡1-𝑡3), 
import values fell by 14.3%, 18.0%, and 
21.2%, respectively. This decline in import 
values was much smaller than the results of 
the named countries, which indicates that the 
imposition of AD duties was successful in 
reducing the value of imports from named 
countries. 
4.4.3 All Countries 
The estimation results for all countries 
can be seen in Table 4.4 column (3). Total 
imports declined by 13.6% in the investigation 
period (𝑡0). Likewise, in the period of 
protection (𝑡1-𝑡3), total imports dropped by 
13.8%, 18.0% and 21.3%, respectively. As 
such, total imports have decreased by more 
than 66% during the investigation and 
protection periods. These declines are 
considered large, although these values are not 
as large as the decline in named countries. 
5 CONCLUSION 
AD measures are used to deter the 
import of dumped goods that cause injury to a 
domestic industry in an importing country. By 
imposing AD measures, importing countries 
hope to see a recovery in prices for 
domestically produced goods. With the 
frequent imposition of AD actions carried out 
by Indonesia over the last two decades, it is 
important to examine what impact these 
measures have had on imports. Empirically, 
we have examined the effect of AD measures 
on Indonesian imports using UN Comtrade 
data at the 6-digit HS codes product level. The 
analysis presented in this paper shows that AD 
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does have a significant restricting impact on 
imports from named countries. AD measures 
succeeded in reducing the import value of the 
products concerned by about 126% during the 
period of imposition. In addition, there was no 
evidence of trade diversion to non-named 
countries. This can be seen from the negative 
sign coefficient in the year of imposition of 
AD measures. In the first three years of AD 
measures, the value of imports to non-named 
countries decreased by around 53%, which is 
smaller than the reduction in the value of 
imports to named countries. Overall, 
Indonesia's AD policy helps to check 
unwanted imports and therefore can be 
considered effective.  
AD duties allowed domestic prices 
and production to increase. It appears that, in 
line with the aims of AD policies, domestic 
producers therefore gained from the enaction 
of AD measures. However, the imposition of 
AD measures does raise a different concern 
from the national interest point of view: 
though such measures are a legitimate method 
of protecting national industries from unfair 
trade action, since AD measures can lessen the 
volume of imports because of the increasing 
import prices, they can to some extent be 
harmful to downstream industries 
domestically. The overall supply will decrease 
as the volume of imports decreases, while 
domestic production is not always sufficient to 
fulfil domestic demand. In other words, when 
downstream industries do not reduce import 
volumes, the cost of production is increased 
because of the higher price of imports. 
Therefore, downstream industries suffer from 
AD implementation. To summarize, then, AD 
is beneficial for domestic producers as a 
remedy for unfair trade, but it can at the same 
time harm domestic users or consumers. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze how 
much consumers lose and how much 
producers gain from the imposition of AD 
duties. 
For future research it should be noted 
that, though this study concludes that AD 
measures in Indonesia have indeed succeeded 
in reducing imports and benefiting domestic 
producers, it is necessary to study the effects 
of the decline in imports caused by AD 
policies from the perspective of consumers, by 
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Hausman Test for Named Country 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained 
from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under 
Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
 
chi2(5) = (b-B)' [(V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B) 
            = 15.22 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0095 
 
Appendix 2 
Hausman Test for Non-Named Country 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained 
from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under 
Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
 
chi2(5) = (b-B)' [(V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B) 
            = 2.04 
Prob>chi2 =      0.8437 




Hausman Test for All Countries 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained 
from xtreg 
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B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under 
Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
 
chi2(5) = (b-B)' [(V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B) 
             = 20.11 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0012 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
